Laudatory Invasion of Privacy by Zolich, Joseph
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1967
Laudatory Invasion of Privacy
Joseph Zolich
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Privacy Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph Zolich, Laudatory Invasion of Privacy, 16 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 532 (1967)
Laudatory Invasion of Privacy
Joseph Zolich*
S LAUDATORY INVASION of privacy actionable?
It can be said that invasion of privacy as an independent tort was
born when Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis published in the
December 1890 issue of The Harvard Law Review' a most influential
and thereafter widely cited article entitled The Right to Privacy, urging
the recognition of the right of privacy as an independent right of an
individual.
Their convincing arguments brought recognition of the doctrine of
the right of privacy by an overwhelming majority of American juris-
dictions, either by case 2 or by statutory law.3 It is now well established
that there is a right of privacy which is not merely incidental to some
other recognized right.4 In the recent Connecticut birth control case,
Griswold v. Connecticut,5 the United States Supreme Court said that the
right of privacy is a right guaranteed by the Constitution.
Although seventy-seven years have passed since its launching, the
right of privacy is still in its infancy. But we can say that the doctrine
is no longer a generality and courts have developed principles which
are applied and followed in jurisdictions where the doctrine has been
recognized. 6
At a moment when privacy is increasingly encroached upon by the
complexity of modern life, making its attainment almost impossible,
courts are charting the line beyond which prying curiosity cannot go.7
* Law Diploma, State Univ. of Belgrade School of Law of Subotica; J.D., Francis-
Joseph Hungarian Univ. of Science School of Law; M.S. in Library Science, Western
Reserve Univ.; Law Librarian, Firm of Arter, Hadden, Wykoff & Van Duzer of
Cleveland; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-
Wallace College.
1 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
2 Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960); For additional material on the subject
matter of right of privacy, see: Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right to Privacy"?,
4 S.D.L.R. 1 (1959); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer
to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 962 (1964); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law and Contemp. Prob. 326 (1966); Annotations
on the Right of Privacy: 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942); 168 A.L.R. 446 (1947), 14 A.L.R.2d
750 (1950).
3 New York, Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia have adopted statutes recognizing the
right of privacy: N. Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51; Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit. 21, §§ 839-40;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-9; Va. Code § 8-650 (1950).
4 Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243, 168 A.L.R. 430 (1945), rehearing, 30
So.2d 635 (1945).
5 381 U.S. 479 (1965); this case held the anti-contraceptive statute unconstitutional,
violating the constitutional right of privacy emanating from the provisions of the
Bill of Rights.
6 Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 526 (1941); as to measure of dam-
ages, see, Oleck, Cases on Damages, 32, 653-6 (1962).
7 Seavey, Cogitation on Torts (Third in the Roscoe Pound Lectureship Series), The
University of Nebraska Press, 1954.
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LAUDATORY INVASION OF PRIVACY
Actionable invasion of the right of privacy has been defined as:
The unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality,
the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no
legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private ac-
tivities, in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering,
shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.8
This definition imposes limitations on the scope of the right of
privacy. Protection is restricted by the standard of a person of ordinary
sensibilities. 9 The right does not afford protection to supersensitivity. 10
Limitations were recognized by Warren and Brandeis who said that
protection should be aimed only at flagrant breaches of decency and
propriety. "
General Principles Pertaining to an Action
For Invasion of the Right of Privacy
The right is considered as an incident of the person and not of prop-
erty.12 Since it is a personal right, designed to protect the feelings and
sensibilities of human beings, it cannot be asserted and enforced by a
corporation.' 3 It is a purely personal action which dies with the injured
party,' 4 unless survival of the action is provided for by statute.15 The
8 41 Am. Jur., Privacy, § 2 (1962).
9 Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises, Inc., 119 N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1963); Strickler v. National
Broadcasting Co., 167 F.Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Reed v. Real Detective Publ. Co.,
63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).
10 Cason v. Baskin, supra n. 4; also see, Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330,
95 S.E.2d 606 (1956); In Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So.2d 715, 718 (Fla.
App. 1961), defendant published plaintiff's name and business telephone number and
told its readers to call that number and ask for the plaintiff if they wanted to hear
a "sexy voice." The court held: "In determining the extent of the right of privacy
the standard by which the right is measured is based upon a concept of the man of
reasonable sensibility; the hypersensitive individual will not be protected."
11 Warren and Brandeis, op. cit. supra n. 1.
12 Reed v. Real Detective Publ. Co., supra n. 9.
13 In Association for Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Nation Co., 35
Misc.2d 42, 228 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (S.Ct. 1962), plaintiff corporation instituted an action
by its representative, among other things, for invasion of privacy. Held that ".... in-
corporated association must sue in its own name and not by representative and that
corporation could not maintain suit for invasion of privacy."
The following cases dealing with this point, agree with Association for Preserva-
tion of Freedom of Choice in that a corporation has no right of privacy: Vassar Col-
lege v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982 (W.D. Me., 1912); Maysville Transit Co. v.
Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W.2d 369 (1944).
14 In Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965), the court
held that under the Illinois law an action brought by administratrix, wife, and son
for recovery of damages for invasion of decedent's right of privacy by publication
and telecasts regarding decedent, cannot be maintained. The right of privacy can
be asserted only by the person whose privacy was invaded. In the absence of any
reference to relatives by the complained publication, an action cannot be maintained
by them.
15 Statutes of Oklahoma and Virginia allow the survival of actions for invasion of
privacy. Okla. Stat. Annot., 21-840; Va. Code 8-650.
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right is lost where the complaining party has consented to the publica-
tion complained of.", It is a well settled rule that want of consent is
essential to make an invasion of the right of privacy actionable. It
does not exist if the injured party has become a public character and
thereby impliedly waived his right to privacy, 17 nor in connection with
the life of a person in whom the public has a rightful interest.' 8 In re-
gard to the ordinary dissemination of news and information, the right
is subordinate to legitimate public interest. 19 The man of reasonable
sensibilities is the norm by which the right of privacy is measured. 20
Spoken as well as written words can constitute actionable invasion of
privacy. 21 In a case based on invasion of the right of privacy, malice is
not required to be shown,2 2 since it is not an essential element of viola-
tion of the right. 23 The plaintiff does not have to allege or prove any
special or pecuniary damages. -  The truth of the published matter does
not constitute a defense to such an action.25
16 Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 808 (1953).
17 Smith v. Doss, 37 So.2d 118 (Ala. 1948); Berg v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune
Co., 79 F.Supp. 957 (Minn. 1948); Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc., 277 App.
Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1950); Leverton v. Curtis Publ. Co., 97 F.Supp. 181 (E.D.
Pa. 1951) afi'd, 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951); Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97
F. Supp. 546 (S.D. N.Y. 1951); Abernathy v. Thornton, 263 Ala. 496, 83 So.2d 235
(1955); Oma v. Hillman Periodicals, Inc., 281 App. Div. 240, 118 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1953);
Jacova v. Southern Radio and Television Co., 83 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955); Jenkins v.
Dell Publications, 251 F.2d 447 (3rd Cir. 1958); In Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 14
Cal. Rptr. 208, 212 (Cal.App. 1961), the court stated: "A person may, by his own
activities or by force of circumstances, become a public personage and thereby
relinquish a part of his right of privacy to the extent that the public has a legitimate
interest in his doings, affairs or character."
18 Sidis v. F-R Publ. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
19 Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344, 348 (1956), was an action to en-
join the sale of newspapers which contained a photograph of the mutilated body of
the plaintiff's murdered son. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the mother's
right of privacy has not been violated: "Where an incident is a matter of public
interest, or the subject matter of a public investigation, a publication in connection
therewith can be a violation of no one's legal right of privacy. There are many
instances of grief and human suffering which the law can not redress. The present
case is one of those instances."
In Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Cal. App. 1962),
considering the limits of the right of privacy, the court said that when current news-
worthy events occur, the persons involved may be named and discussed in news-
papers or over the air even though such publicity actually invades the privacy of the
individual; Hubbard v. Journal Publ. Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962).
20 4 Restatement of Torts, § 867, Comment c; Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises, Inc.,
supra n. 9; Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., supra n. 10.
21 Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So.2d 321 (1961); There is author-
ity according to which mere spoken words cannot constitute actionable invasion of
privacy; see Cason v. Baskin, supra n. 4 at 251, 252.
22 Cason v. Baskin, supra n. 4.
23 Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., supra n. 17; In Fairfield v. American Photocopy
Equipment Co., 138 Cal.App.2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955), the court, commenting on the
elements of the invasion of right of privacy pointed out that if the publication does
not amount to actionable invasion of plaintiff's right, the presence of actual malice
in the publication would not change that result and would not render it actionable.
24 Cason v. Baskin, supra n. 4.
25 Ibid.
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Types of Invasion of Right of Privacy
and Interests Protected
In a comprehensive survey of authorities, 2 Prosser found that courts
have protected individuals against four kinds of invasion of privacy,
namely, (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical and mental seclusion
or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of private
facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which presents the plaintiff in a
false light to the public; and (4) appropriation of plaintiff's identity for
the defendant's benefit or advantage. Laudatory invasion of privacy
cases fall into the category of public disclosure of private facts about the
plaintiff.
It has been held that in order to constitute invasion by public dis-
closure, the disclosed fact must until then have been private and not
public,27 since there can be no privacy in that which is already public.
28
The disclosure must be accompanied by sufficient publicity, communi-
cated either by written or spoken words to a large number of people, 29
as opposed to only a few.30 In addition, the disclosed fact must be of
such a nature that a reasonable man could foresee that it would prob-
ably cause mental distress,3 1 shame, or humiliation to a person of or-
dinary sensibilities.32
Does Laudatory Invasion Constitute
A Substantial Invasion of Privacy?
To constitute a cause of action, an invasion must be a substantial,
serious, or indecent intrusion upon the private life of another.3 3 Liability
exists and accrues only where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits
of decency.3 4 Publications describing ordinary goings or comings of
persons, and any other publications to which people do not ordinarily
seriously object, do not amount to invasion of right and are not action-
able.35 The law does not provide a remedy for every annoyance that
26 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 2; Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239
(1964).
27 Gill v. Hearst Publ. Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953).
28 Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
29 Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d 708 (1941).
30 Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940); Brauer v. The
Globe Newspaper Co., 217 N.E.2d 736 (Mass. 1966).
31 Reed v. Real Detective Publ. Co., supra n. 9.
32 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 2; Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F.Supp. 817
(D.C. 1955); afl'd, 232 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
33 Frick v. Boyd, 214 N.E.2d 460 (S.Ct. Mass. 1966).
34 4 Restatement of Torts, § 867, Comment d.
35 Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959).
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occurs in everyday life, regardless of its distressing effect, lack of pro-
priety, and good taste.
36
In Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co.,37 the plaintiff instituted an
action for invasion of privacy for the publication of a photograph in The
Saturday Evening Post in connection with an article on suicide. The
photograph showed the plaintiff trying to dissuade a woman from jump-
ing off the Golden Gate Bridge. The caption of the picture fittingly
portrayed the scene, naming plaintiff and the woman.
In holding that no actionable invasion of plaintiff's privacy occurred,
the court said that where the photograph depicts nothing to shock the
ordinary sense of decency or propriety, where the photograph in itself
does not present something uncomplimentary or discreditable, and where
the caption and article do not add new meaning to the photograph mak-
ing it uncomplimentary, no actionable invasion of the right occurs.
The court also stated that the picture was most laudatory and in no
way showed the plaintiff as reprehensible. A reasonable man could find
nothing in plaintiff's conduct which would give rise to the belief that
the picture would offend the sensibilities of a normal person. The court
also said that the picture was newsworthy and constituted a privileged
publication precluding plaintiff's recovery. It is plain that the published
photograph of the plaintiff in this case made him a hero in the eyes
of the public by praising his humanitarian services. If courts recognized
causes of action in cases like this, then contrary to the objective of the
law, hypersensitivity would be protected.
In Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,35 the plaintiffs, husband and wife,
sued for invasion of privacy. They alleged that their privacy had been
invaded by a picture taken at plaintiffs' place of business and published
in Harper's Bazaar, which presented the couple in a romantic pose, the
husband having one arm about his wife. The plaintiffs had not con-
sented to either the taking of the photograph or its publication.
The court held that mere publication of the photograph standing
alone did not amount to an actionable invasion of plaintiffs' right of
privacy and pointed out that there was no disclosure of a private fact
theretofore unknown to the public. The publication of the picture only
gave extended publicity to a larger audience of an incident that could
have been witnessed at the time of its occurrence by a smaller audience.
In addition, the photograph portraying the couple in an amorous pose
was not uncomplimentary or discrediting in itself thereby making its
publication objectionable as going beyond the limits of decency. In
fact, the court said that the photograph may very well be regarded as
complimentary and pleasing in its pictorial presentation of plaintiffs. The
36 Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951).
37 122 F.Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
38 Gill v. Hearst Publ. Co., supra n. 27.
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LAUDATORY INVASION OF PRIVACY
photograph of the plaintiffs depicts an incident that can be seen every
day, everywhere, and is readily distinguishable from pictures which are
shocking, revolting, or indecent. 39
In Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co.,40 the plaintiffs brought an action for
invasion of privacy alleging that without their consent the defendant
published in the Ladies Home Journal, in connection with an article en-
titled Love, the same picture as in the Hearst case. 41 The picture was
captioned "Publicized as glamorous, desirable, love at first sight is a
bad risk."
The court found that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action. The
court stated that when words are related to a photograph, the public
interest may be prevailing and such a publication may be privileged.
But in this case it was held that the objective of the article could have
been achieved and the public interest satisfied without the publication
of plaintiffs' picture. The court further found that the caption and article
portrayed the plaintiffs as persons who had only a sexual interest in each
other thereby seriously impinging their sensibilities. This case is an
example of how words may turn a complimentary, non-objectionable
photograph into a publication constituting an actionable invasion of
privacy. Both decisions are sound principles of law.
The plaintiff in Cason v. Baskin42 sued to recover damages for in-
vasion of privacy by the defendant who had written a book which was
published without the plaintiff's consent. The defendant, through a vivid,
colorful, and graphic description, created a pen portrait of plaintiff
recognizable to plaintiff and her friends, although the defendant made
no reference whatever to the plaintiff by name.
The court held that a prima facie case had been stated which would
entitle plaintiff to recover at least nominal damages. The court found
that the book complimented the plaintiff, portraying her as a fine, in-
telligent person with an attractive personality. However, the court held
that since the book was also a vivid and intimate character sketch of a
person who is not a public personage, plaintiff had stated a cause of
action and could recover nominal damages.
It seems clear, however, that in this case defendant did not invade
plaintiff's private life. Plaintiff was a census taker, a public servant,
and it was his conduct on the job that was described by defendant.
39 In Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1962), the court held the
right of privacy had been invaded where a picture of plaintiff was taken against her
protest while she was in bed in a hospital and was published in connection with an
article describing her rare disease and unnecessarily identified her.
In Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964), held right of
privacy had been invaded where a picture of plaintiff was surreptitiously taken and
published, depicting plaintiff in an embarrassing pose with her dress blown up.
40 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952).
41 Gill v. Hearst Publ. Co., supra n. 27.
42 Cason v. Baskin, supra n. 4.
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Therefore, the court should have found the publication privileged since
it dealt with matters of general interest.
The case of Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co.,43 was an action to
recover damages for invasion of privacy. Plaintiff complained of the
publication of his photograph by the defendant in conjunction with an
advertisement in a magazine. The court found that there was implied
consent which precluded plaintiff from recovery. The court stated that
another reason why plaintiff could not recover was that plaintiff, ac-
cording to his own admission, was complimented by the fact that the
photograph presented him as a highly skilled worker performing an
important and intricate job in the construction of an airplane.
It has been held that the essence of a cause of action in a privacy
case is injury to the feelings of the injured person. 44 In the absence of
such an injury, no cause of action can arise.
In Frick v. Boyd, 4 a case decided in Massachusetts where the
common law right of privacy has not been recognized, the plaintiff in-
stituted an action to enjoin distribution of a book written by defendant.
Plaintiff alleged that the book invaded her right of privacy. In the
book defendant described her 30 years of employment by plaintiff in
social work at a vacation home for working girls founded and operated
by plaintiff as a charity. All the references in the book to plaintiff were
highly complimentary, expressing in an enthusiastic way defendant's
admiration for petitioner's charitable endeavors.
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the facts did not warrant
equitable relief. The court said with respect to the common law right
of privacy in the Commonwealth, "If there is such a right in this Com-
monwealth, we would not be prepared to extend it to a case like the
present." The court noted that it would determine the existence of the
right of privacy in Massachusetts only when faced with a situation in-
volving some substantial, serious, or indecent intrusion upon the private
life of another. In the court's view, this harmless and inoffensive book
did not present such a situation.
The court's denial of relief in this case rests on sound grounds.
The book was a straightforward portrayal of events and was com-
pletely complimentary to the petitioner. It did not, for example, dis-
cuss in lurid detail the immoral past of a reformed prostitute,46 nor did
it cast doubt on the moral integrity of the petitioner.47 It did not reveal
43 Supra n. 16.
44 Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., supra n. 17.
45 Supra note 33. See also, Themo v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 306
Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940); Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d
286 (1951).
46 Melvin v. Reid, supra n. 28.
47 Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal.App.2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942).
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the intimate characteristics of the plaintiff,4 s nor did it involve an em-
bellished and sensationalized account of an individual's domestic
troubles. 49 It can hardly be said that the book involved in this case could
be offensive to the sensibilities of an ordinary person.
The State of New York does not recognize the common law right
of privacy. In that State, the right is derived from and governed by
statute. 50
In the case of Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.,5 1 plaintiff, a major
league baseball pitcher, sued for the invasion of his right of privacy by
the publication of an unauthorized and intentionally fictionalized bi-
ography for juvenile readership. The court held that the plaintiff could
recover. The court said that the plaintiff was a public figure and thus
could be the subject of a biography published without his consent, even
though the biography might contain some superficial inaccuracies. In
this case, however, the biography was not based on truthful facts. Thus
it was not privileged and could not be published without the consent of
the individual.
In such case, the court observed, the laudatory nature of the
fictionalized treatment is immaterial. Neither the view that it must be
fictionalized to make it appealing to juvenile readership nor the compli-
mentary nature of the fictionalized treatment is justification for the
publication. This is so because the distorted presentation may make the
plaintiff look ridiculous in the eyes of those who know the true facts.
It is hard to determine what is laudatory, and one may strongly object
to being depicted in a distorted way. Complimentary invasion of pri-
vacy may have some mitigating influence upon the assessment of dam-
ages.
In Molony v. Boy Comics Publishing, Inc.,5 2 plaintiff sued to re-
cover damages for the alleged violation of his right of privacy by the
publication of a story in drawings, praising plaintiff's heroic action in
rescue operations when a United States Army bomber crashed into the
Empire State Building in New York City. In connection with the air-
plane disaster, plaintiff was catapulted into the public light and became
a national figure.
The court found no violation of plaintiff's right to privacy under the
New York Civil Rights statute, 53 since a publication dealing with a
public figure was privileged. Further, the court also found the publi-
48 Cason v. Baskin, supra n. 4.
49 Aquino v. Bulletin Co., supra n. 35.
50 Supra n. 3; Cardy v. Maxwell, 9 Misc.2d 329, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547 (S.Ct. 1957).
51 23 App. Div.2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965); aff'd, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966).
52 Supra n. 17.
53 Supra n. 3.
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cation free of libel and full of praise for the plaintiff for his heroic
deeds.
Conclusion
The general principles controlling the right to recover for invasion
of the right of privacy are fully applicable to laudatory invasion of
privacy. Applying these principles, it is clear that an invasion of privacy
which is laudatory in nature constitutes a cause of action if the publica-
tion is one which would be offensive and objectionable to a man of or-
dinary sensibilities. Therefore, whether a person may or may not be
subjected to laudatory publicity without his consent will be determined
by the sensitivities of a reasonable man.
The right of privacy may be subordinated to the prevailing public
interest. For example, the right of privacy cannot be invoked where
the laudatory use of a name or photograph is made, within the bounds
of propriety and decency, in connection with the dissemination of news
and information of public concern. Consequently, the legitimate public
interest is a good defense in an action based on laudatory invasion of
privacy.
If the facts give rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy,
the laudatory nature of the publication is no justification for the in-
vasion of the right.
Disclosure of laudatory facts for commercial purposes gives rise to a
cause of action regardless of the laudatory nature of the disclosed matter.
The holdings of the reviewed cases indicate that the laudatory na-
ture of the invasion may have some influence as a mitigating factor in
the assessment of damages.
Sept,, 1967
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